But Milot wrote back, “Legal construction needs more than looking for a sympathetic dictionary.”
The judge pointed to a number of examples, “The text of the several provisions of the law indicates that the authors should have humans, not machines.”
The judge noted that machines do not have the lives or spouse
Mille wrote that perhaps most obviously, the copyright period is usually “limited to the author’s age or a period of how many days the human being can survive.”
Milit wrote, “Of course. The machines do not have life, nor is their operative length is usually measured in the same terms as human life.
In addition, the judge noted that the law allows copyrights to be transferred to spouses or children surviving, which the machines do not have. This also refers to the authors’ domicile and nationalities, which the machines do not have. And critically, the authors intend to intend to copyright, while “machines lack the minds and they do not intend to do anything.”
Mille writes that accepting Thaler’s arguments would mean that “troubled questions about the” life “of the machine and ‘death’ will arise. “” And ‘machine’ means unattended a device used by the author and authors. “
The judge made fun of data poetry, says machines cannot be writer
According to the court, law machines are always considered tools, never writers. Milot wrote, it includes Thaler’s creative machine. He emphasized that Thaler’s arguments will not be best given to the Congress or the copyright office to the courts.
However, according to the judge, when it comes to artificial intelligence, the creativity machine does not represent the limits of human technical ease, “and can adapt to the Congress or the copyright office rules or guidance if” at some point a human being can develop a creative non -hoc “is encouraged to create art works.